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In pain
Paul Noordhof
When I feel a pain in my leg, how should we understand the ‘in’ in ‘in the
leg’? Michael Tye has suggested in a number of places that the Represen-
tationalist has a neat explanation of what the ‘in’ means (Tye 1995b:
226–28 or 331–32; Tye 1995c: 111–16; Tye 1996: 296–97). Peter Car-
ruthers has agreed (Carruthers 2000, ch. 5). Tye’s Representationalist
holds pains are states which represent damage to, or disorder in, the body.
When pain represents damage in the leg, then the ‘in’ is simply that of
spatial location. Pains representing disorder in phantom limbs, and cases
of referred pain, merely involve misrepresentation of spatial location. The
merit of Tye’s proposal, as he sees it, is that no special sense of ‘in’ needs
to be introduced. I shall argue that Tye is wrong. I have sympathy with the
Representationalist position in general, although I would not develop it 
in the way that Tye suggests. However, I am concerned that we are clear
about what supports the position and what does not. Tye’s point offers 
no support at all.1
Tye invites us to consider the following invalid argument taken from Ned
Block.
(1) The pain is in my fingertip.
(2) The fingertip is in my mouth.
Therefore,
(3) The pain is in my mouth.
Block notes that the argument is valid if the ‘in’ is taken to be that of spatial
location. However, he claims that the argument is not valid when the state-
ments are understood in their ordinary sense. So the ‘in’ must be used in a
different systematic way for the location of pains (Block 1983: 517). Tye
claims that this is not so. The ‘in’ is just that of spatial location. The infer-
ence is invalid because pain creates an intensional context. He compares
the argument above with the following.
(4) I want to be in City Hall.
(5) City Hall is in the ghetto.
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1 Tye has also run arguments appealing to the intentionality of representational states
for what-it’s-like contexts (Tye 1995a: 125–26). I think that they have been answered
successfully by Daniel Stoljar (Stoljar 1996: 281–83).
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Therefore,
(6) I want to be in the ghetto. (Tye 1995b: 226–28 or 331–32; Tye
1995c: 111)
There is no special sense of ‘in’ which needs to be introduced to explain
why the argument is invalid. It is just that ‘want’ creates an intensional
context.
In the case of the City Hall, the following is true.
There is a location in the ghetto such that I want to be there.
What is false is that I want to be in that location in the ghetto conceived as
such. So, likewise, Tye will have to say
There is a location in my mouth such that I feel pain (or given his pre-
ferred usage: bodily disorder) there.
However, our problem seems to be reintroduced. There is a sense in which
this statement seems false. It is, of course, true that there is also a sense of
‘in my mouth’ in which the statement is correct. Pain represents a bodily
disorder in my finger and my finger is in my mouth. However, if I were to
feel a pain in the mouth and there was no state of bodily disorder in the
nerves relating to the mouth but there was a state of bodily disorder in my
finger, my pain would not represent something true.
The point is underlined by considering the following argument.
(7) I believe that City Hall is in Central Square.
(8) Central Square is in the ghetto.
Therefore,
(9) I believe that City Hall is in the ghetto.
Although (9) doesn’t follow from (7) and (8), the proposition I would
believe, if (9) were true, is true. This contrasts with what is represented in
(3). Hence, Tye is wrong to suppose that adopting a Representationalist
approach to pain allows us to take the ‘in’ in ‘in pain’ to be simply that of
spatial location. Indeed, what Block’s nice observation reveals is that when
we experience a pain in the finger – as I would prefer to put it – the Rep-
resentationalist should say that the experience is veridical only if the cause
of this experience is a disordered state of the finger. Even if I am sucking
my finger, that is quite distinct from a disordered state of the mouth.
Fortunately, contrary to what Block and Tye fear, Block’s observation
does not reveal that there is a special sense of ‘in’ only appropriate for
bodily sensations. The following argument seems to display precisely the
same invalidity as the original argument.
(10) There is a hole in my shoe.
(11) The shoe is in the box.
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Therefore,
(12) There is a hole in the box.
There are many similar examples.2 What they reveal is that there is a sense
of ‘in’ which is used to describe a state of an object. Perhaps that is what I
was describing when I said I had a pain in my leg.
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